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Abstract— We describe a web based federated identity 
management system loosely based on the user centric 
Windows CardSpace model. Unlike CardSpace that relies on 
a fat desktop client (the identity selector) in which the user 
can only select a single card per session, our model uses a 
standard web browser with a simple plugin that connects to 
a trusted attribute aggregation web service (TAAS). TAAS 
supports the aggregation of attributes from multiple identity 
providers (IdPs) and allows the user to select multiple single 
attribute “cards” in a session, which more accurately reflects 
real life in which users may present several plastic cards and 
self-asserted attributes in a single session.  Privacy 
protection, user consent, and ease of use are critical success 
factors. Consequently TAAS does not know who the user is, 
the user consents by selecting the attributes she wants to 
release, and she only needs to authenticate to a single IdP 
even though attributes may be aggregated from multiple 
IdPs. The system does not limit the authentication 
mechanisms that can be used, and it protects the user from 
phishing attacks by malicious SPs. 
Keywords-attribute aggregation, identity management 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A user’s digital identity can be stated as the set of 
attributes used to represent the user within a specific 
context. In the standard model for federated identity 
management systems (FIMS), such as Shibboleth [2] or 
Liberty Alliance [11], the context is the federation or circle 
of trust and the attributes are taken from the authentication 
and attribute assertions (or claims) released by the user’s 
identity provider (IdP) to the service provider (SP). FIMS 
were often built under the assumption that a user would 
use a single institutional or corporate IdP for accessing 
each SP in the federation. As FIMS mature the size and 
scope of them become increasingly large e.g. in 2013 the 
UK Access Management federation had 940 members [3]. 
It is increasingly likely that a user will have several 
accounts at different IdPs within these federations. 
Furthermore, as the authorisation requirements of SPs 
become more complex, it is increasingly unlikely that one 
IdP can provide the full set of attributes that an SP 
requires. Consider purchasing a car parking permit online 
from a local council. The user may need to provide the 
following authorisation attributes: 
- Proof of name and address, i.e. that they live in 
the local area 
- Proof that they have a car 
- Proof that they have a credit card to pay the fee. 
These attributes will typically be asserted by different 
IdPs. In the UK, these are most likely to be: the 
Department of Works and Pensions, the Driver Vehicle 
Licensing Authority and a bank respectively. 
Although the Information Card/Windows CardSpace 
model is no longer supported by Microsoft, nevertheless it 
had some excellent features in terms of identity 
management, usability and security. A good high level 
overview of CardSpace can be found in [1]. It assumed 
that a user has accounts at different IdPs, and that each IdP 
will issue claims containing different lists of her attributes. 
Each information card is a representation of a partial 
identity of a person’s online digital identity and the full set 
of cards is a representation of the user’s entire digital 
identity. Information cards can either be self-asserted or 
IdP asserted. From a usability perspective InfoCards 
provide a metaphor that is familiar to users and is 
reminiscent of the plastic cards that everyone carries 
around today in their wallets. From a security perspective, 
conventional phishing attacks are thwarted, since the user’s 
identity selector redirects the browser to the genuine IdP, 
rather than a malicious SP redirecting the browser to a 
false IdP. Consequently we have kept these features.  
However, CardSpace had some significant flaws. The 
WS-Trust exchanges [13] require the user to provide her 
authentication credentials to the Identity Selector. This 
severely limits the types of authentication method that can 
be utilised by the IdPs. CardSpace also made the same two 
fundamental mistakes as other FIM models by assuming 
that (a) the user need only select a single IdP (or card) in a 
session, and (b) this IdP will issue all the user’s attributes 
that are needed for this SP. Contrast this to plastic cards, 
where users typically have lots of them issued by different 
IdPs, and each card typically holds only one (or very few) 
user attribute(s), i.e. the attribute the IdP is authoritative 
for, along with supporting information such as: the name 
of the user, the validity period of the card, a unique card 
identifier, a mechanism to authenticate the user (usually a 
signature or PIN, but could be a photograph as well), and 
details of the card issuer. Other contents such as holograms 
and chips are there to ensure the authenticity of the card 
and to stop forgeries. They do not provide additional 
attributes of the user. It is therefore not uncommon today 
for a user to provide several cards in a single transaction, 
along with self-asserted information. Thus as FIMS 
expand to Internet scale, users will need to aggregate their 
attributes or claims from multiple IdPs, as well as provide 
some self-asserted attributes. This is what TAAS provides. 
The use of multiple IdPs has several advantages to 
users and SPs.  A single IdP is no longer required to issue 
all of a user’s attributes, which is an unrealistic assumption 
to make. Legal constraints and liabilities will make it very 
difficult for any IdP to make claims about a user’s 
attributes for which it is not authoritative. For example, a 
credit card issuer would never make assertions about a 
user’s driving ability, nor would a driver licensing centre 
make claims about credit worthiness. Rather each IdP will 
assert the attribute(s) for which it is authoritative and 
willing to bear the risk. This means that a user will need to 
pick from multiple IdPs the subset of their attributes that 
they wish to present to a SP, rather than passing their entire 
(sub)set in a single card issued by a single IdP. However 
this presents severe difficulties to today’s IdPs, since no 
single IdP knows all the other IdPs at which a user has 
accounts, and users will probably want to keep it this way. 
We have already published details about our privacy-
preserving Linking Service for attribute aggregation [4], 
which allows users to perform a single login and then 
aggregate additional attributes from other linked IdPs 
based on a pre-set policy. A summary of the user trials can 
be read in [6]. This revealed that users want to dynamically 
choose  which  attributes  from  a  specific  IdP  should  be 
asserted and which shouldn’t. This is what TAAS 
provides. So the contributions of this paper are: the 
description of a conceptual model for a privacy preserving 
dynamic trusted attribute aggregation service, and its 
implementation, which provides users will full fine grained 
control over the release of their attributes, both self-
asserted and IdP asserted, without it knowing the identity 
of the user, which allows any authentication method to be 
used, prevents phishing attacks, and uses standard 
protocols and standard web browsers with a small plugin. 
This rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 describes the conceptual model. Section 3 describes our 
implementation using standard protocols. Section 4 
concludes and says where further work is still needed. 
II. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Today’s federations use a layered communications 
approach in which each layer utilises the services of the 
lower layer to provide additional value to the application 
layer. The bottom layer is the TCP/IP connectivity layer 
which provides end to end synchronous connections 
between two parties. The client server layer builds on this 
to provide user authentication between the user client and 
the server (an IdP).  The federation layer builds on top of 
the client server layer to provide authentication between 
two previously unknown parties (the client and the SP). 
Our model proposes an additional layer on top of this, the 
attribute aggregation layer. This contains an attribute 
aggregator that is responsible for aggregating a user’s self-
asserted attributes with assertions from multiple IdPs, 
before presenting the combined set of attributes to the SP. 
This model assumes that the user is the only person 
who knows about all her IdP accounts, and that she does 
not wish the other IdPs to know this information.  We 
assume that some IdPs have pre-existing trust relationships 
with other IdPs and SPs but not that universal trust 
relationships exist between all entities. We do however 
require that an SP trusts all the IdPs that it receives 
attribute assertions (claims) from, and that the SP, the user 
and the IdPs trust our new attribute aggregation web 
service (called the Trusted Attribute Aggregation Service -
TAAS) to confidentially hold the user’s set of aggregated 
IdP accounts. The purpose of TAAS then, is to hold, in a 
privacy preserving way, the links to, and the attribute types 
held by, the user’s different IdPs, as well as the user’s self-
asserted attributes. TAAS acts as the user’s identity 
selector eliminating the need for a fat client on the user’s 
desktop. As the IdPs link to TAAS they have no 
knowledge of any of the user’s other IdP accounts. TAAS 
knows that some user has a set of linked IdP accounts, but 
it does not have any specific knowledge of who the user is, 
or the values of the attributes that are stored in each 
individual IdP account, apart from the user’s self-asserted 
attributes. When linking an IdP account to TAAS the IdP 
releases only the types/names of the attributes and not the 
actual attribute values. Only the SP receives the attribute 
values, digitally signed and encrypted by their originating 
IdPs, as a result of attribute aggregation during the service 
provisioning phase. 
The attribute aggregation protocol requires an IdP to 
release a user’s attributes to the SP when TAAS requests 
it, without the user authenticating to the IdP. 
Consequently, TAAS needs to assure itself that the 
initiator of the current session is the IdP account holder 
and not an imposter.  We solve this, along with the privacy 
requirement that TAAS does not know the identity of the 
user, by requiring the user to directly authenticate to each 
IdP during the linking phase, and for the IdP to provide a 
shared secret to TAAS which can subsequently be used to 
identify the user in future attribute aggregation sessions. 
A. Link Registration 
IdP accounts may be linked and configured at TAAS 
either before or during the service provisioning phase. 
Accounts are linked by the user authenticating to several 
IdPs in the same session.  A user’s initial TAAS account is 
created by navigating to TAAS, which acts as a 
conventional SP, and logging in using any IdP that has a 
trust relationship with TAAS. TAAS forwards the user to 
the IdP’s authentication endpoint, which presents the user 
with an authentication dialog, allowing the user to 
authenticate with her credentials. After authentication, the 
IdP should ask the user which attribute types and values 
she wants to make available to TAAS for subsequent 
aggregation in service sessions. The IdP is then able to 
generate an attribute assertion for TAAS containing the 
user's chosen subset of her attribute types/names that the 
IdP is able to issue for the user. If the user selects a multi-
valued attribute then the IdP should return both a 
type/name and pseudo-values to allow TAAS to refer to 
individual values during the selection phase, without 
TAAS learning the actual values. If no attribute assertion is 
returned it is assumed that the IdP will only be available 
for authentication and will not release any attributes for 
aggregation. Each attribute (pseudo-value) contained in the 
assertion will subsequently be displayed to the user as a 
separate card for selection during service provisioning. 
The login request from TAAS to the IdP requests an 
authentication token containing a randomly generated but 
persistent identifier (PId) for the user.  This PId will be 
stored by TAAS and subsequently used as a pair-wise 
secret between TAAS and the IdP in order to identify the 
user’s account in all future communications between the 
two parties. 
When TAAS receives a new (previously unknown) PId 
at login time, it creates a new entry for the user in its 
internal database. When TAAS receives an existing PId at 
login time, it retrieves the user’s existing entry from its 
database and updates it to reflect the current set of 
attributes. For each linked IdP, TAAS stores: the PId of the 
user at this IdP, the set of attribute types/names and pseudo 
values that can be released by this IdP, and the level of 
assurance (see below). If the user wishes to link additional 
IdP accounts to her existing TAAS entry then she 
authenticates to another IdP and TAAS requests another 
set of information which it adds to the same user entry. 
B. Level of Assurance 
Different IdPs authenticate users in different ways and 
to different strengths. This is termed the Level of 
Assurance (LoA) [5]. It can be loosely thought of as how 
sure a relying party can be that the user is really who they 
say they are.  This depends not only on the authentication 
method – which we term the Authentication LoA – but 
also on the initial vetting and registration process that the 
user underwent – which we term the Registration LoA.  
NIST [5] classifies a user’s LoA at four levels, with level 4 
being the strongest and level 1 being the weakest. A 
limitation of the NIST recommendation is that its LoA is a 
compound metric dependent on both the authentication 
method and the registration process. We believe that they 
are more useful if they are separate metrics, since IdPs 
may offer different authentication methods and a static 
registration procedure, or may alter the registration 
procedure that is used with the same authentication 
method. Thus we introduce a dynamically calculated 
Session LoA into the TAAS protocol.  An IdP should set 
the Session LoA to the value of the Authentication LoA 
for the authentication method used by the user for this 
session, but with one proviso. No Session LoA can be 
higher than the Registration LoA used by the IdP when the 
user last registered with it.  
When the user first registers with TAAS, the incoming 
Session LoA is stored as the user’s Registration LoA with 
TAAS. During the service provision phase TAAS will 
only use linked IdPs whose Registration LoA’s are higher 
than or equal to the current Session LoA, determined by 
the authenticating IdP. This prevents the user from creating 
links with low Registration LoAs and using them at higher 
Session LoA’s, since this may give an escalation of 
privileges. A user can create links at high Registration 
LoAs and use them at lower Session LoAs, since this is not 
a security risk. 
When a linked IdP receives a service request for 
attributes from TAAS, it extracts the Session LoA from the 
authentication assertion and compares this to its local 
Registration LoA. If the Session LoA is less than or equal 
to the latter then the IdP will release additional attributes to 
the SP (via TAAS), otherwise if the Session LoA is higher 
than the Registration LoA then the IdP will not release any 
attributes to the SP. 
C. Service Provision Phase 
We introduce a thin client - the TAAS discovery plugin 
- for the user’s browser. This plugin is activated when 
TAAS login is requested by a SP. It is used to discover the 
user’s TAAS, redirect the user to this TAAS and return the 
multiple IdP assertions from TAAS to the SP. When a user 
navigates to a TAAS enabled SP’s restricted page it should 
explain that user login is required and should describe its 
security policy, in terms of  which attributes are  needed  to  
Figure 1.  TAAS Protocol Flow 
access the protected content, and how strong the 
authentication should be. This makes the user aware of 
what is required, providing greater transparency than with 
many of today’s federated IdPs. It allows the user to decide 
which TAAS and linked IdPs to use and consent to 
providing the necessary attributes.  
The SP’s page should contain a TAAS icon (or other 
button) for the user to select, which has an embedded 
MIME object containing the SP’s security policy (see 
below). When the browser attempts to process this 
embedded object it triggers the TAAS discovery plugin 
registered as the MIME handler. The plugin displays the 
TAAS discovery screen which allows the user to choose 
her preferred TAAS, thus thwarting phishing attacks since 
a malicious SP is not able to redirect the user to a TAAS of 
its own choosing. The URL(s) of the user’s preferred 
TAAS(s) can be added to the plugin in two ways. The user 
can bookmark a site as a TAAS by saving its home page 
URL in a bespoke bookmark folder accessible by the 
plugin. Alternatively the user can dynamically add a new 
TAAS when the plugin is invoked by entering its URL 
directly into the plugin. This allows users to utilize TAAS 
from any device without having to pre-store bookmarks of 
their preferred TAAS(s) beforehand. Thus our system can 
be used on any public or Internet café computer without 
releasing personal information to other users. 
When the user has selected her TAAS the plugin 
establishes a TLS connection with TAAS to protect all 
future communications between the browser and TAAS.  
The plugin constructs a HTTP POST message containing 
the SP’s security policy for the protected resource and 
redirects the user to the TAAS URL. The receipt of the 
SP’s security policy is treated as a service provision 
request for the required attributes to be aggregated and 
delivered to the SP. TAAS parses the security policy and 
extracts the set(s) of attributes and their associated issuers.    
If the user has already established a prior session with 
TAAS from this browser, the browser’s cache may contain 
a valid TAAS cookie containing the user’s account 
identifier at TAAS, and a valid single sign on (SSO) 
cookie that may allow TAAS to authenticate the user 
transparently with the IdP.  If not, TAAS will not be able 
to access the user’s account and will need to discover one 
of the user’s IdPs e.g. by using a Where Are You From 
(WAYF) service to display the list of all the IdPs that it has 
trust relationships with. The user chooses one of these IdPs 

















IdP to generate an authentication assertion, containing a 
randomly generated transient identifier, which acts as an 
SSO token valid at any entity that trusts this IdP, and a 
“referral” assertion containing the pre-linked PId which 
points to the user’s account at TAAS.  The user logs in to 
the IdP, and the IDP returns both assertions to TAAS.   
TAAS is now able to access the user’s account and 
display the set of “cards” that match the SP’s policy. Each 
card icon represents one part of the SP’s security policy. 
Multiple sets of cards will be displayed if the SP provides 
several alternative policies (see later). Cards are marked as 
either required or optional, depending upon the SP’s 
policy. All required cards must be selected before 
aggregation can take place. We envision the optional cards 
will represent self-asserted attributes required by the SP for 
communication or marketing purposes rather than 
authorization. The user clicks on the card icon and this 
displays an attribute selection overlay containing all the 
user’s previously linked attributes that match this part of 
the SP’s policy. Each attribute is shown as a card with its 
name, issuer and pseudo-value (as provided to TAAS by 
the IdP) and the user chooses the attribute/card she wishes 
to send to the SP. For example, if the SP required a credit 
card from a bank, when the user clicks on the card icon, 
the overlay will display each credit card type from each 
bank that the user had previously linked with TAAS, 
allowing the user to dynamically choose her preferred 
credit card attribute for this transaction. 
If no previously linked attributes match the SP’s 
security policy, then when the user clicks on the card icon, 
TAAS asks the user to dynamically link a new IdP account 
to her existing TAAS account. If the user agrees, a new 
discovery/WAYF screen is shown that only displays those 
IdPs that are trusted by the SP to issue the required 
attribute. Once the user has authenticated to one of these 
IdPs, the new IdP account details are added to the user’s 
existing TAAS entry, before the attribute selection card 
overlay is reshown to the user.  The user is now able to see 
the newly linked attribute and select it, in order to fulfill 
this part of the SP’s security policy. This allows users to 
dynamically link all their needed attributes during the 
service provisioning phase without any prior setup. 
The user selects an attribute by double clicking on its 
card and the overlay is removed. The card icon is now 
shown with a large green tick on it. Once all the cards have 
been ticked the user can choose one of three options: 
1. Click the Submit button, in which case the selected 
attributes will be aggregated from the IdPs and sent to the 
SP (but the selections will not be remembered). 
2. Click the Save and Submit button, in which case the 
selected attributes will be remembered in TAAS’s database 
before aggregation commences. In this case, if the user 
attempts to access the same resource at the same SP again, 
the last set of selected attributes will be pre-selected and 
the card icons displayed with large green ticks. 
3. Click the “Don’t Bother Me Again” tickbox and then 
click the Save and Submit button. This stores the selected 
attributes along with a flag, before aggregation 
commences. If the user accesses the same resource at the 
same SP again, TAAS will transparently aggregate the 
same set of attributes again, without showing the attribute 
selection page to the user. This equates to the “one-click” 
functionality of Amazon. 
After the user clicks one of the submit buttons, TAAS 
will query each of the chosen IdPs for the user’s attributes, 
as well as its database for any pre-stored self-asserted 
attributes. An IdP query comprises: an attribute query 
requesting a subset of the SP’s requested attributes (as 
chosen by the user), an encrypted referral pointing to the 
user’s account at the IdP and the original authentication 
assertion. The recipient IdP uses the authentication 
assertion to determine whether it trusts the initial act of 
authentication by the authenticating IdP. If the 
authenticating IdP is not trusted then the recipient IdP 
should return an error to TAAS. If the IdP does trust the 
authenticating IdP then it generates an attribute assertion 
containing the user’s attributes and encrypts this assertion 
to the SP (which it must also trust to privacy protect the 
user’s attributes). The user is identified in this attribute 
assertion with the random transient identifier from the 
authentication assertion, so that all the assertions from all 
the IdPs will contain the same user identifier. The attribute 
assertion is returned to TAAS, which stores it until all the 
queried IdPs have replied. 
Self-issued attributes are stored in TAAS’s database by 
the user selecting the Manage My Personal Details tab at 
any time. This allows the user to add any identity attribute 
types and values that she wishes, whether fictitious or not. 
Since they are self-issued TAAS does not care what the 
contents are. When a self-issued attribute is selected by the 
user to fulfil an SP’s policy, TAAS creates a new attribute 
assertion encrypted to the requesting SP with TAAS as the 
issuer. This newly created assertion can then be added to 
the set of attribute assertions collected from the IdPs. 
Once all the attribute assertions have been collected by 
TAAS it generates a POST response to the endpoint 
specified in the SP’s security policy, which the browser 
uses to redirect it to the SP. This response contains the 
authentication assertion, its own encrypted attribute 
assertion (for self-asserted attributes) and each of the 
encrypted attribute assertions returned from the IdPs.  
Consequently the SP receives a set of assertions containing 
a single authentication token and multiple attribute 
assertions which all contain the same random transient 
identifier. Since the SP trusts all the authoritative sources 
and TAAS, and can verify that they have all issued the 
assertions from their signatures, it can be assured that the 
same user possesses all of the returned attributes, and has 
been successfully authenticated. 
D. Service Provider’s Security Policy 
The SP’s security policy is an XML structure stored 
within a MIME object. Conceptually this structure offers a 
similar request structure to a SAMLv2 Attribute Request 
message but it has been expanded to encompass requesting 
attributes from multiple IdPs. Conceptually this policy 
consists of four pieces of information: 
• The identifier of the SP and its associated public key 
with which authentication and attribute claims can be 
encrypted.  
• The endpoint to which claims for the protected 
resource should be submitted.   
• A list of IdPs which the SP trusts to authenticate the 
user and their minimum acceptable Authentication LoAs.  
• Its authorisation policy, consisting of one or more 
attribute sets each of which describe a collection of 
attributes. An attribute comprises the type/name of the 
attribute and a list of all the IdPs that the SP trusts to issue 
values for it.  
Authorisation policies are specified in either conjunctive 
normal form (CNF) or disjunctive normal form (DNF): 
• In CNF each attribute set consists of one of more 
attributes of which exactly one attribute must be chosen. 
The chosen attributes are then combined together to form 
the complete set required to access the protected resource. 
An example of this is the car parking permit policy 
described in the Introduction. 
• In DNF all the attributes in a single attribute set must 
be provided to access the protected resource at the SP, but 
multiple alternative sets can be defined. An example of this 
is: to download a paper from an online journal, a user may 
provide either a credit card attribute from a bank, or a 
current journal membership number, or a proof of faculty 
membership from a university. 
CNF policies allow the SP to specify groups of similar 
attributes that are equivalent, whereas DNF policies allow 
completely different alternative sets of attributes to be 
specified. The SP’s policy allows TAAS to transparently 
filter out untrusted IdPs from the aggregation process and 
ensures that only those attributes that fulfil the SP’s 
authorisation requirements will be aggregated. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION 
Our conceptual model has been implemented using the 
Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML) v2 
protocol and customised HTTPS POST messages for 
interactions between the SP and TAAS. We use the SAML 
Identity Assurance profile [7] to pass the Session LoA 
between components. 
A. Link Registration Protocol 
TAAS is assumed to have received the SAML 
metadata [12] of the IdPs it trusts prior to user linking. It 
uses these to determine the SAMLv2 authentication 
endpoints, and to construct standard SAMLv2 
<samlp:AuthnRequest> messages to these endpoints. This 
message requests that a PId be returned as the Subject of 
the <samlp:Response>. It uses the AttributeConsumer 
Index attribute to specify that all available attributes should 
be returned in the response. To ensure that the IdP always 
returns a PId: 
• the Format attribute of the <NameIDPolicy> is set to 
“urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent”,  
• the allowCreate attribute of the <NameIDPolicy> is 
set to true, which allows the IdP to create a PId if none 
already exists. 
In response, the IdP constructs a <samlp:Response> 
message containing a single authentication assertion 
consisting of two statements, an Authentication statement 
element and an Attribute statement element. The 
Authentication statement describes the actual act of 
authentication performed at the IdP and the attribute 
statement contains the set of SAML attribute types/names 
that can be aggregated from this IdP. 
B. Service Provision Protocols 
The protocol mappings for attribute aggregation use a 
combination of existing SAMLv2 protocols and HTTPS 
POST operations. The former is used between TAAS and 
the IdPs and the latter between the SP and TAAS via the 
browser. The SAML protocols encode referrals as Liberty 
Alliance ID-WSF Endpoint References (EPRs) according 
to the EPR generation rules defined in Section 4.2 of [8].  
The EPR’s <sec:Token> element contains a SAMLv2 
bearer assertion with the encrypted PId of the user as the 
assertion’s Subject element. This allows the recipient to 
determine which subject is being referred to. 
C. SP to TAAS interactions 
When the user clicks on the TAAS icon, the browser 
detects the presence of a specific embedded MIME object 
in the HTML page and activates the TAAS discovery 
browser plugin. The plugin allows the user to choose her 
preferred TAAS and it constructs a new HTTP POST 
message to the chosen TAAS page. This POST message 
contains the SP’s security policy embedded in the MIME 
type as a POST parameter named spPolicy. TAAS parses 
the XML security policy and, if the user is not already 
logged in, uses it to display a WAYF page that matches the 
SP’s authentication requirements.   
Once attribute aggregation is complete TAAS has a 
single SAML authentication assertion and zero or more 
SAML attribute assertions to relay to the SP. These 
attribute assertions are all signed by their issuers and 
encrypted to the SP. When the user presses a submit 
button, TAAS creates a new SAMLv2 Assertion, with a 
single attribute statement containing each of the 
aggregated assertions as separate attribute values. This 
assertion is signed by TAAS and returned to the SP’s 
endpoint defined in its security policy, using a TLS 
encrypted HTTP POST message that requests the browser 
to return control to the SP. The SP can decrypt the 
message to access the attributes and authentication details 
and authorise the user.  
D. User Authenticating to an IdP 
When the user needs to authenticate to TAAS, TAAS 
constructs a <samlp:AuthnRequest> message requesting 
that the IdP returns a signed SAMLv2 Authentication 
SSO token and a separate encrypted  SAMLv2 bearer 
attribute assertion valid at itself.  The authentication SSO 
token should be unencrypted, contain a transient/random 
ID for the user, and be valid at any recipient. The bearer 
token must contain the LA ID-WSF EPR as a subject 
attribute, with the PId set to allow TAAS to identify the 
authenticated user. This is accomplished by setting the 
AttributeConsumingServiceIndex attribute to request that 
the EPR attribute is returned, which also informs the IdP 
that the attribute aggregation profile has been selected. 
After the user has authenticated to the IdP, by any method 
it supports, it constructs the authentication assertion and 
sets the AuthnContext element to contain the session LoA 
for the authentication method that was used (subject to it 
having a maximum value of the Registration LoA). These 
assertions are then placed in a <samlp:Response> 
message and returned to TAAS. 
TAAS decrypts the referral contained in the 
wsse:Security element of the EPR, using its private key, to 
obtain the PId of the user. It looks up the user in its 
database, and filters the user’s linked accounts against the 
SP’s security policy. It then displays the attribute selection 
screen to the user. 
E.  Attribute Aggregation with the IdPs 
Normal HTTPS request/response messages are used 
between the browser and TAAS to enable the user to select 
which attributes from which IdPs she wishes to aggregate 
together.  
Once the set of IdPs has been determined, TAAS 
constructs a referral to each IdP by creating a SAMLv2 
Bearer assertion containing an EPR with the encrypted PId 
of the user that is shared between itself and the IdP. TAAS 
then constructs a SAMLv2 attribute query message to each 
IdP, using the SAMLv2.0 Attribute query profile from 
SAML Core [9], requesting the subset of attributes that the 
user has chosen to be returned from this IdP. The SOAP 
envelope containing the AttributeQuery message has a 
<samlp:AttributeQuery> as its body element and a 
<wsse:Security> [10] element in its header, which 
comprises the newly constructed SAMLv2 Bearer 
assertion and the original authentication assertion from the 
authenticating IdP. The subject of these attribute queries is 
the transient/random identifier extracted from the initial 
authentication assertion.  The IdP identifies the user’s 
account by decrypting the PId in the SAMLv2 Bearer 
assertion stored in the <wsse:Security> header and 
determines whether or not it trusts the initial act of 
authentication by examining the signature of the 
authentication assertion in the same <wsse:Security> 
header. The IdP can differentiate between the referral 
assertion and the authentication assertion as only the ID in 
the referral assertion will match a stored PId in the IdP’s 
system, and this assertion will directly reference the 
authentication assertion.  It then uses the transient/random 
subject identifier from the authentication assertion as the 
subject ID in the newly generated attribute assertion.  
As it is TAAS that is querying the IdP directly rather 
than the SP, it is necessary to include an 
AssertionConsumerServiceURL attribute in the 
AttributeQuery message that specifies the SP as the entity 
to which the resulting attribute assertion should be 
encrypted (Section 3.4.1 of [9]). The encrypted attribute 
assertion is then inserted into a <samlp:Response> and 
returned to the querying TAAS.  
TAAS waits until each queried IdP has responded and 
collates the combined set of attribute assertions into a 
single SAMLv2 Assertion. This contains a single attribute 
statement containing each of the aggregated assertions as 
separate attribute values. Any self-asserted attributes 
stored in TAAS’s database form an additional assertion 
value. The single assertion is signed by TAAS and 
returned to the SP’s endpoint defined in its security policy 
by using a TLS encrypted HTTP POST message that is 
returned to the browser, which posts it to the SP. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Whilst the CardSpace model had some notable security 
and usability properties, it also had some significant flaws. 
We have combined the best user-centric features from 
CardSpace with the existing SAMLv2 security framework 
to provide a system that is better than the sum of its parts. 
The resulting TAAS system provides users with a more 
user friendly portable approach to identity management, 
which gives them fuller control and consent over the 
selection and release of their attributes, whilst protecting 
them from phishing attacks. TAAS also goes beyond the 
capabilities of either previous system by providing built in 
support for attribute aggregation. We believe this will 
become an increasingly important access control 
requirement as applications become more demanding and 
security conscious, where the present model of expecting a 
single IdP to hold all a user’s attributes will no longer be 
sufficient. 
We have implemented the work described in this paper 
as a fully featured demonstrator1 and released the code as 
open source as part of the Open PERMIS project2. Future 
work could be to provide the TAAS functionality entirely 
within the browser, as an alternative to using an external 
trusted server. Work is still required to define a standard 
ontology for both attributes and IdPs, so that an SP’s 
security policy can refer to generic entities rather than to 
individually named attributes and IdPs, which could get 
lengthy if there are many trusted entities of the same type. 
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